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Article 2

THE AMENDED STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE:
A DECADE LATER
Thomas M. Clusserath*
Under the authority of its rule-making power under Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter referred to as SEC) has adopted a series of rules, designated the
Proxy Rules, which govern the solicitation of proxies by any person in respect
of any security registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.' Of these proxy rules, the most controversial is Rule 14a-8 (set out
in Appendix), the stockholder proposal rule. This Rule requires the management of a company which is soliciting proxies2 for a meeting of stockholders
to include a proper stockholder proposal in its proxy statement when certain
conditions are met. Those advocates of the small shareholder movement in
institutions of higher learning and in the public and private practice of law
and business have cited this Rule as the true bulwark of shareholder democracy.3
They argue that for the small shareholder, Rule 14a-8 now presents the sole
means for the current exercise of initiative by him as an individual share4
holder.
After a public hearing, the SEC in early 1954 amended Rule 14a-8. One
amendment concerned the' procedure required for'a reasonable presentation to
management by a stockholder of a proposal for inclusion in the proxy statement. The second amendment included a technical limitation on resubmissions of identical proposals year- after year to the same company. Another
amendment was concerned with the substance of a proposal, i.e., whether the
proposal contained proper subject matter for stockholder action. With respect to the procedural amendment, the amended Rule required a sixty- instead
of thirty-day prima facie advance submission of a proposal to themanagement.
* Former attorney-adviser in the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and
Exchange Commission for better than two years. During that time, he 'served also in the
capacity of an assistant to one of the present members of the Commission.
1 It should be noted that Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78n) has been amended, as of August 20, 1964, (78 Stat. 565) to apply to the solicitation of
proxies by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise by any person in respect of any
security registered on any national securities exchange or of any security of a company of a
certain size with so many stockholders which is traded in the over-the-counter market. Also, it
should be noted that the Regulation 14 proxy rules have been applied to the solicitation of any
proxies regarding any security of a registered holding company, pursuant to Section 12(e) and
Rule 61 under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6)
and to the solicitation of any proxies in respect of any security of which a registered investment
company is the issuer, pursuant to Section 20(a) and Rule 20a-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. §§80a-I through 80a-52).
2 In a solicitation of proxies from stockholders by the management of a company, three
items are usually furnished to each stockholder: a written notice of the meeting for which the
proxies are solicited; a written proxy statement concerning the matters to be taken up at the
meeting (see Rule 14a-3 and Schedule 14A); and a proxy to be filled in by the shareholder
(see Rule 14a-4).
3 See Bayne, Caplin, Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making
Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. Rav. 387 (1954); Freeman, An Estimate of the
Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549 (1957);
Heller, Stockholder Proposals,4 VA. L. WEEKLY DicTA ComP. 72 (1952-1953).
4 Bayne, Caplin, Emerson and Latcham, supra note 3, at 391.
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Thus, the individual shareholder, for a particular shareholder meeting, had
to submit his proposal at least sixty days in advance of the day corresponding
to the first date on which management proxy-soliciting material was released
to security holders in connection with the last annual meeting of security holders (Rule 14a-8(a) ). The second amendment substituted for the prior 3 per
cent resubmission figure a progression requiring that a proposal which draws
3 per cent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto on its first submission has to receive 6 per cent on its second submission, and 10 per cent
on all subsequent occasions in order to remain qualified for resubmission at the
next shareholders' meeting. Those that fail to obtain a 3-6-10 per cent vote
are banned from successive submission for three years, instead of one year, as
had been the case prior to the 1954 amendment (Rule 14a-8(c) (4) ). And
the substantive amendment specifically provided that the former requirement
that a proposal had to be a proper subject for action by security holders under
the laws of the issuer's domicile was to be retained (Rule 14a-8(c) (1) ), but
it limited the proper subject test by providing that a proposal amounting to
a recommendation or request with respect to the "conduct of the ordinary
business operations" of the company could be omitted by the management
(Rule 14a-8(c) (5) ).
Advocates of the small shareholder movement saw in these three amendments some added responsibilities for the SEC as administrator of this Rule.
First, there is the present SEC's responsibility of not permitting
through its interpretation, particularly of the limitation placed on
the "proper subject" test and of the application of the 60-day prima
facie advance submission requirement, provisions for management
protection to deteriorate into instruments of shareholder suppression.
A further responsibility the present Commission has undertaken is
the responsibility periodically to review the experience under these
amendments to determine whether the amendments - insofar as
they provide mathematically higher percentages and longer time
periods, and insofar as they do not directly admit flexible interpretation - are, in effect, resulting in less individual or representative shareholder participation in corporate affairs.5
They concluded that if either responsibility of the SEC in the administration
of this Rule was not fulfilled, the ultimate result of the 1954 amendments
would be shareholder suppression, and not merely management protection,
and that such a result would require a further amendment of the Rule, or
restoration of the rescinded provisions.'
Needless to say, Rule 14a-8 has not been amended in the decade since
1954, nor has the SEC disclosed much, through public releases, concerning
the administration of this Rule. Thus, this article will attempt to document'
Commission and staff action in the past ten years under Rule 14a-8. Atten5 Id. at 430-31.
6 Id. at 431.
7 Due to the fact that some of the information to be presented in this article concerns
arguments made by management and proponents which were not placed in public files at the
SEC, it will be necessary to avoid citing the names of companies and stockholders, except in
cases where their arguments have become a matter of public record. But this inability to cite
names should not detract from the benefit to be gained from a discussion of the treatment by
the Commission and the staff of varied subject matters in proposals, their informal decisions,
and various internal procedures used by the SEC in making such informal decisions.
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tion will be focused on the subject matter of proposals which management
has opposed to determine whether the SEC (Commission or staff) has omitted
such proposals either under the 8(c) (1) argument that the proposal is not
a proper subject for action under the laws of the issuer's domicile, or under
the 8(c) (5) argument that the proposal relates to management action with
respect to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer. Attention will also be focused on how the SEC has used the sixty-day advance
submission requirement to permit management to exclude stockholder proposals and on how the SEC has interpreted the technical 8(c) (4) proviso
which permits management to omit "substantially the same proposal" if the
3-6-10 per cent votes are not obtained on resubmissions. In disclosing the
SEC's administration of Rule 14a-8 in these three areas, the writer will attempt to evaluate the SEC's activity and to offer some constructive suggestions.
I. Pre-1954 History of Rule 14a-8
Under the early proxy regulations as adopted pursuant to Section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, some ad hoc action of the SEC resulted
in the genesis of the stockholder proposal rule. In the 1939 fiscal year, the SEC
was faced with a company's proxy-soliciting material which contained no information concerning two amendments to the by-laws which were to be proposed at the coming meeting of the stockholders by an independent stockholder.
The management of the company had been advised of the stockholder action
before it prepared its soliciting material. The Commission took the view that,
since the proposed amendments pertained to matters to which the stockholders
might properly address themselves, since the management was advised of the
proposed amendments prior to the time its proxy-soliciting material was prepared
and sent to stockholders, and since the proxies were apparently to be used for
purposes of a quorum supporting action upon the proposed amendments, the
omission from the proxy-soliciting material of information concerning such
amendments rendered misleading the statement of management to the effect
that the proxies would be used only with respect to the election of directors
and not with respect to any other matter. The SEC required the management
to send to stockholders a further communication fully apprising them of the
stockholder proposals and giving them an opportunity to revoke the proxies
which they had given.' As a result of further proposals by stockholders which
the SEC felt compelled to make management include to prevent management's proxy statement from being misleading, the stockholder proposal rule
(then known as Rule X-14A-7) was adopted on December 18, 1942, and
became effective on January 15, 1943.1
Under Rule 14a-7, management had to include in its proxy statement
a stockholder proposal intended to be presented for action at the meeting if
the stockholder had given management reasonable notice and if the proposal
was a "proper subject for action by the security holders." As to the first condition, "reasonable notice," the new Rule 14A-7 provided that "notice given
more than thirty days in advance of a day corresponding to the date on which
8
9

5 SEC ANN. REP. 62 (1939).
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3347, Dec. 18, 1942.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
proxy-soliciting material was released to security holders in connection with the
last annual meeting of security holders shall, prima facie, be deemed to be
reasonable notice." In a public release in 1945, the SEC quoted approvingly
from a letter of the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, interpreting the phrase "proper subject for action by security holders" to mean:
[M]atters relating to the affairs of the company concerned as are
proper subjects for stockholders' action under the laws of the state
under which it is organized. It was not the intent of the Rule X-14A-7
to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders
with respect to matters which are of a general political, social or
economic
nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of such
0
views.'
In 1952, the Commission specified that proposals which were "for [the]
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
similar causes" could be omitted."'
In 1947, the SEC announced the redesignation of Rule 14A-7 as Rule 14a-8,
which designation it has retained until the present time. 2 In 1948, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to permit the omission of a stockholder proposal for
three additional reasons: (1) if it clearly appeared that the proposal was submitted by the security holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal
claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its management;
(2) if the security holder had failed at the last two annual meetings to present
his proposal at the meeting after management had at his request included it in
its proxy statement; and, (3) if substantially the same proposal had been presented at the last annual or special meeting and had failed to receive three
per cent of the total number of votes cast' 3
In 1953 a public hearing was held on proposed amendments to the stockholder proposal rule. On the three amendments to Rule 14a-8 adopted in early
1954, the Commission made the following noteworthy comments. They will be
of interest in the subsequent examination and evaluation of the SEC's administration of these amendments.
The amended rule specifically provides that a security holder's proposal may be omitted from the management proxy material if it is
one which, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, is not a proper
subject for action by security holders. The amended rule thus specifically provides that state law is to be the standard of eligibility
of a proposal under the rule. The Commission wishes to make it
clear that it considers this standard consistent with the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the case of SEC v. Transamerica Corp.,
163 F.2d 511 (3rd Cir. 1947). Under the provisions of the amended
Rule X-14A-8(c) (5), management would also be permitted to
omit from its proxy material a proposal which is a recommendation
or request with respect to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.
The rule places the burden of proof upon the management to show
that a particular shareholder's proposal is not a proper one for inclusion in managements proxy material. Where management con10
11
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tends that a proposal may be omitted because it is not proper under
state law, it will be incumbent upon management to refer to the
and furnish a supporting opinion of
applicable statute or case law
14
counsel. [Emphasis added.]
II. SEC Administration of the Amended Portions of Rule 14a-8
Since it is the intent of this article to document, as far as possible, the action
of the SEC regarding stockholder proposals since Rule 14a-8 was amended in
1954, some description of the nature of Commission action in this area is in order.
It should be noted that SEC action under Rule 14a-8 is not, except in a
few rare cases,"' a formal administrative adjudicatory order within the meaning
of the Administrative Procedure Act."8 Rather these decisions must be understood in their context as informal administrative determinations not directly
subject to review by Courts of Appeals. To the outsider these decisions take the
following form in letters: that the Division of Corporation Finance or the Commission itself will raise no objections if the management omits the stockholder
proposal from its proxy material or that the Division or Commission finds no
reason for the omission of the stockholder proposal by management from its
proxy material.
The greater percentage of the decisionsF discussed hereunder have been
made by the Division of Corporation Finance' without Commission approval
or Commission review. Those decided specifically by the Commission have been
taken there by the Division upon request of the proponent or the management
of the company involved or upon the motion of the Division itself where an
issue is important enough for decision by the Commission.
This article is not concerned with the administration of Rule 14a-8 in situations where management has included a stockholder proposal in its proxy statement without any objection to such inclusion pursuant to paragraph (d) of
Rule 14a-8.
A. Proposalas Submitted is not, Under Law of Issuer's Domicile,
Proper Subject for Action by Security Holders
This basis for exclusion of stockholder proposals from managements proxy
statement (14a-8(c) (1)) had its birth with the development of the stockholder
14 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4947, Jan. 6, 1945. For a full text of Rule 14a-8
(17 C. F. R. § 240.14a-8 (1964)), see the Appendix.
15 See three formal opinions of the SEC pursuant to Section 12(e) and Rule 62 under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: SEC Public Utility Holding Company Act
Releases Nos. 13450, April 17, 1957; 13710, March 21, 1958; 13962, March 26, 1959.
16 The formal administrative decisions would involve some form of adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. See Section
5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1950)).
17 All footnote cites to these decisions will provide the following information: the deciding body which will be indicated by a Commission Minute (COM. MIN.), a Division memorandum (DIV. MEMO.), or a Division letter (DIV. LET.) cite; and the full date. For an
understanding of the reason behind the omission in most instances of the names of companies
involved, see supra, note 7.
18 Usually the decisions of the Division of Corporation Finance are found either in a
memorandum to an assistant director or the chief counsel or in a subsequent letter of the Division to the issuer and/or the proponent. It should be noted, as hereinafter demonstrated, that
the responsible authority (branch attorney, branch chief, assistant director or chief counsel)
for many of these decisions by this Division has not dearly been determined.
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proposal rule as a positive statement that management must include a proposal
which is a proper subject for action by security holders. The most recurrent
problems for the SEC under this provision appear to have been the interpretation of the proposals in the light of applicable state law. In 1954, in the release
adopting this language, the Commission specifically noted that state law was
to be the standard of eligibility19 and that it considered this consistent with the
1947 case of SEC v. TransamericaCorporation."
The Third Circuit faced such a state law question with respect to three
proposals submitted by John Gilbert in the Transamerica case.21 Were they
proper subjects under Delaware law for action by security holders? The Third
Circuit found that all three proposals were proper and specifically held that
a proposal that shareholders elect independent public auditors, whether considered as a proposed by-law amendment or just a mandate to the board of directors, may not be deemed to be peculiarly within the discretion of the directors,
who by Delaware statute are entrusted with the management of the business.
The Court noted that "a corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders
and not for that of its managers." 2 2 Second, the Court, in the most important
part of its decision, noted that where a proposed action (amendment of the
by-laws of the corporation) is within the purview of stockholders under state
law, a procedural by-law of the company, which required that notice of any
proposed alteration or amendment of the by-laws be contained in the notice of
the meeting and which was valid under state law, may not frustrate "corporate
suffrage." 2 As to the last proposal, which required that a post-meeting report
be sent to all stockholders, the Court required inclusion for the reason that there
is "no logical basis for concluding that it is not a proper subject for action by
security holders."'"
Prior to the 1954 rule change, the Commission, faced with state law that
was and is meager in specifics with respect to proper subjects for stockholder
action, ruled that:
[P]roposals purporting to direct the directors in the management
of the business operations of the company are improper. So also
are the proposals commanding the directors to initiate corporate
procedures which they alone can initiate, or proposals which ignore
the statutory role of directors and propose the direct adoption of the
particular corporate procedure. However, proposals relating to matters in those areas which are confined to management exclusively
under state law are held proper by the Commission, if they are
19

See Heller, supra note 3, at 74, speaking of the state law standard:
[Tihis must necessarily be so since the stockholder, if his proposal is
adopted, must rely for its validity and enforcement solely on the law of the
state of incorporation. The Commission is given no power in Section 14
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prescribe or determine what is
desirable for the internal government of corporations.
20 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
21 The Commission had decided that the management should include the three Gilbert
proposals. Management refused. The Commission sought an injunction in the United States
District Court to force the inclusion of these proposals. The District Court found that management had to include only one proposal. The Third Circuit found that management must
include all three proposals.
22 SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1947).

23 Id. at 518.
24 Id. at 517-18.
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phrased merely as a request or recommendation that the board
consider the 5advisability
of the action or procedure proposed by the
1
stockholders.
In nonauthoritative sources, such as law review articles and the Gilberts'
Annual Reports,26 it often appears that a good percentage of the proposals
included, prior to 1954, when in the form of a request or recommendation (i.e.,
advisory in nature, rather than mandatory) related to what the layman might
classify as the "ordinary business operation" of the issuer. For example, in
1952, the Commission held that the management of AB had to include a
proposal relating to the elimination of the company practice of reducing retired employees' pensions by one-half or any part of the benefits received by
such retired employees under the Social Security Act, if in form a recommendation.27 Now, proposals which relate to everyday business operations are
specifically excluded, whether in the form of a directive or of a recommendation by Rule 14a-8(c) (5).' So one whole area of advisory- proposals is
no longer a proper subject for stockholder action under SEC law, if not
under the applicable state law. But the following pages will demonstrate that
the problem of whether a proposal, in whatever form, is a proper subject for
action by security holders has generated, since 1954, some confusion and inconsistency in Commission and Division decisions.
1. Proper Subjects Since 1954
It is only intended to review some of the important landmark decisions
in the broad range of proposals and in the forms that these proposals may take.
A more detailed analysis will be made in II.A2 of state law and forms for
proper proposals thereunder.
Proposals dealing with subjects not felt to be peculiarly within the discretion of the board of directors, notwithstanding the state's general corporation law,
have been included. This reasoning had its genesis in the Transamerica case.
In 1958, the Commission required management to include a mandatory proposal requiring a full audit of the company and a subsidiary by an independent
accountant.29 In 1962, the Commission, while adopting the Division's reasoning somewhat along the same lines as above, required the management of CC
to include an advisory resolution requesting the board of directors to direct
the Chairman not to impose any arbitrary time limit on statements by stockholders at the annual meeting.3" This request was included despite a by-law
of the company which vested the direction of the meeting in the Chairman.
25 Heller, supra note 3, at 74-75.
26 E.g., Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate
Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REv. 141 (1953); Gilbert and Gilbert, ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCICHOLDER AcTIvnTEs AT CORPORATION MEETINGS (from 1940); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 874

(1948).
27 AB, COM. MINUTES, Feb. 18 and 19, 1952.
28 In 1954, the Commission permitted the management of AB to omit an advisory proposal
for the elimination of the company practice of reducing retired employees' pensions by onehalf or any part of the benefits received by such retired employees under the Social Security
System, pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c) (5). AB, COM. MINUTES, Feb. 10, 12, 16 and 19, 1954,
and March 3, 1954.
29 COM. MINUTES, Feb. 18 and 24, 1958.
30 CC, COM. MIN., Feb. 19, 1962.
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Proposals which relate to matters not specifically prohibited by state law
which seem closely connected with basic, minimum shareholder rights have
been included under the reasoning in the Transamerica case that there is no
logical basis for not finding these to be proper subjects. In 1957, in a
rather important decision that will be fully discussed later, the Commission
found that part of a mandatory proposal directing SS to give a security holder
a complete list of stockholders was a proper subject. 1 In 1959, the Commission approved the Division's reasoning that a proposal requesting that a
company furnish to shareholders for every meeting a proxy statement and form
of proxy complying with the requirements of the rules of the SEC was a proper
subject for action by security holders, whether advisory or mandatory in form. 2
Where the subject matter of the proposal (such as the sale of assets and
merger or the approval of an investment advisory contract for a mutual fund)
under state or federal law must eventually be approved by the stockholders, the
proposal has been held to be a proper subject for action by security holders."3
This reasoning is identical to that in the Transamerica case. The Commission
has relied not only on state statutes for indications of matters subject to stockholder approval, but on state case law also. In 1955, it required the management of AA to include a proposal requesting the board of directors to
submit a charter amendment to the stockholders. The amendment prohibited
the board and the officers from making agreements or contracts with any director or stockholder owning over 10% of the company's stock without first
obtaining the approval of a majority of the stockholders.3" The applicable
New Jersey case law held that a transaction between a corporation and a director or a stockholder with substantial holdings was subject to stockholder approval. 5 But in 1964, the Commission did not require management to include
a proposal directing the board of directors of a mutual fund to institute suit
against the fund's investment adviser for certain mismanagement of its securities, even though Maryland case law required prior to a derivative action by
stockholders that an effort be made to obtain action by the directors. "
Certain subjects seem to have been viewed as proper subjects for action
even though the stockholder may submit two or three proposals very similar
in nature and which in effect are a form of harassment. In 1955, the Commission held that the management of AA must include two proposals demanding investigations of two different sales by the company of portfolio securities,
if they were revised as a request or recommendation."
In 1961, the Commission went further and required management to include two mandatory
proposals directing the directors and officers to retain special counsel for in31 SS. COM. MIN., March 22, 1957.
32 COM. MIN., Feb. 13, 1959.
33 In DIV. LET., March 23, 1954, the included proposal requested and petitioned the
board of directors to secure an offer for the sale and/or merger of the company and to report
to stockholders for their consideration and approval. In COM. MIN., Feb. 10, 1964, the
included proposal directed that in the future the mutual fund shall not enter into an investment
advisory contract except upon approval by shareholders as a result of submission to shareholders of bids and proposals from at least three investment advisory organizations.
34 AA, COM. MINUTES, March 31 and April 4, 1955.
35 See AA, DIV. MEMO. March 30, 1955.
36 See DIV. MEMO. of Feb. 7, 1964, and proxy statement of same company.
37 AA, COM. MINUTES, March 31 and April 4, 1955.
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quiring into the propriety of two major contracts."8 However, the Commission indicated that "its determination . .. was not to be -taken as a policy
determination by the Commission that any and all contracts or transactions
outside of ordinary business of a corporation necessarily gave to stockholders
the right to request an investigation thereof." 9
It should be noted that stockholder proposals with respect to such matters
as stock option plans for officers, cumulative voting for the election of directors,
and information about annual stockholder meetings generally receive favorable
treatment from the Commission, even though management may have sound
reasons for omitting. For example, an advisory resolution proposing restrictions
to be placed in future stock option plans had to be included in the proxy statement, notwithstanding the fact that the company did not contemplate a new
option plan in the near future.4 0 A proposal directing the board of directors
to take all necessary steps to provide for cumulative voting for election of directors was permitted to be included in a proxy statement if cast as an advisory
proposal (recommending or requesting)1 In 1962, the Division required
management to include a proposal requesting that the proxy statement be released to the financial press at the same time it was mailed to the stockholders."2
No matter how proper a subject matter the approval or disapproval of
corporate action is by security holders, the Commission will not permit a stockholder proposal submitted for a special meeting of stockholders called for such
approval, if it imposes a condition to the exercise of the authority to be granted.
In other words, the approval or disapproval may be a proper subject, but the
approval or disapproval conditioned in the above circumstances by a. stockholder proposal is not a proper subject. For a special meeting of stockholders
in 1955, the Commission permitted management to omit a stockholder proposal
consenting to a flood loan borrowing (for which the meeting was called) upon
certain express conditions.4" This view is somewhat similar to the rule that a
proposal which in effect is a negation of a management proposal is not a
proposal within the meaning of Rule 14a-8."
2. GeneralTypes of State CorporationLaw and
Their Effects on Form of Proper Proposals
As noted earlier, recurrent problems arise with respect to the interpretation of stockholder proposals under the applicable state law. Probably no area
of state statutory law is less fruitful than this. The difficulty is that there
have been few cases dealing with shareowner's rights or proper subjects for
45
their attention.
38 COM. MINUTES, May 2 and 5, 1961.
39 See COM. MIN. of May 5, 1961.
40 COM. MIN., Jan. 17, 1959. See DIV. LET., Jan. 6, 1958.
41 COM. MINUTES, Feb. 24 and 27, 1961.
42 DIV. LET., March 22, 1962.
43 COM. MINUTES, Oct. 10 and 11, 1955.
44 E.g., DIV. MEMO., Jan. 7, 1955; COM. MIN., March 3, 1961; COM. MIN., March
7, 1961.
45 Caplin, supra note 26, at 147-48:
A word about state statutory developments during the past twenty years.
At this level we have witnessed a marked trend toward the overhauling and modernization of corporation statutes. However, the emphasis has
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The Delaware Code, a typical state statute, provides that "the Business
of every corporation organized under the provisions of this chapter shall be
managed by a board of directors, except as hereinafter or in its certificate of
incorporation otherwise provided." 6 In at least two instances, the Division
has used or has sanctioned management's use of the following reasoning where
such a statute is in effect: under such a statute, for the shareholders to act
in this business area, the certificate of incorporation or by-laws must so provide or they must be amended to so provide; since they do not and since the
proposal is not in the form of a proposed amendment to the certificate or bylaws, the proposal is not a proper subject for action by'stockholders. In 1955,
the Division, using this approach, permitted management to omit a mandatory
proposal directing that all major decisions of management should be approved
by the shareholders,"7 and, in 1960, permitted management to omit a proposal
directing the board of directors to engage in a study of the benefits of diversification and to seek opportunities to acquire companies."8 Certainly, the Division ignored the reasoning in the Transamerica case that notwithstanding such
statutes, subjects not felt to be peculiarly within the discretion of the board may
be submitted to stockholders in mandatory proposals without amending the
certificate of incorporation. If they did not feel that this reasoning was appropriate for these particular subject matters (that major decisions of management be approved and that the board make a study of diversification), surely
the Commission decision in the AA case in 1955, which required management to include two proposals for investigations of past contracts, if in the
form of a request, should have guided the Division in the 1960 ruling. In
1957, the Division permitted management (a business trust) to omit a proposal
requesting the trustees to secure the cancellation of a contract or not to renew
it, because the proposal was not in the form of an amendment to the declaration of trust or by-laws under which the management of the business had been entrusted to the trustees. 49 This decision may have been sounder than the above
ones because under business trust law, activities of all parties (trust, trustees
and shareholders) must be specifically set out in the declaration or by-laws (by no
means the case under general corporation law).
There are some activities which are specifically set out in the state statutes
or in the by-laws, such as the declaration of dividends and stock options, as being in the discretion of the board of directors. The Commission, and especially
the Division, have given various treatment to stockholder proposals relating
to such matters. In 1957, the Division permitted management to omit a stockholder proposal directing that a stock option plan be terminated and that prior
to reinstatement stockholder approval be acquired, because it would violate a

46
47
48
49

still been upon keeping pace with the growing demands of businessmen and
promoters: in regard to providing flexibility for the corporate venture and in
regard to clarifying some of the uncertainties of corporation finance. Little
thought has been given to the individual investor; if anything, the state
statutes adopted during this period have tended to curtail, rather than to
expand, his rights.
8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(a) (1953).
DIV. LET., Oct. 4, 1955.
DIV. LET., Feb. 24, 1960.
DIV. LET., Feb. 26, 1957.
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statute vesting in the board power to create stock plans."0 It held that such
a statute can be evaded only by a proposed amendment to the certificate or
by-laws.51 Later in 1957, the Division held that a by-law provision entrusting
the determination of appropriate amounts of working capital to the board
of directors would make a proposal relating to use of working capital improper
if it was in the form of a mandate or directive to the board of directors; but
the Division held that a request or recommendation for board action would
be proper.5 2
As noted above, some state statutes specifically give the board of directors
the power to declare dividends and usually the articles and by-laws do likewise.
In 1955, the Division, following the above reasoning, permitted management
to omit a mandatory proposal respecting future dividends, because such a
proposal, imperative in nature, would violate state law, and the company's
articles and by-laws which contained such provisions giving the power to declare
dividends to the board of directors.53 But in 1955, the Commission in a landmark decision did not follow the Division's reasoning with respect to advisory
proposals (i.e., a mandate may violate the law or the by-laws, but a request
or recommendation will not and so is proper). The Commission unanimously
held, with separate statements by each Commissioner, that management could
omit a proposal recommending a special cash dividend. 4 The Chairman's
paraphrased statement seems most noteworthy: This proposal, whether phrased
as a request or as a mandate, is not proper in the light of state law, the company's charter and by-laws, accumulated jurisprudence and general corporate
law to the effect that questions of declaring dividends come solely within the
jurisdiction of corporate directors. It is also noteworthy here that the Commission did not decide this under Rule 14a-8 (c) (5) (i.e., that the declaration
of dividends is a matter relating to the ordinary business operations of the issuer), although management had made this argument. 5 Again in 1964, the
Commission, in a split decision (2 to 2) permitted management to omit a
precatory proposal recommending a cash dividend. " The Chairman and one
other commissioner, voting for inclusion of the proposal, held in separate statements that under local New York law, recommendations by stockholders which
are not binding upon management are nevertheless proper subjects for stockholder action; that in the amendment of Rule 14a-8 in 1954, it was recognized
50 DIV. LET., March 13, 1957. In DIV. LET., March 4, 1958, the Division permitted
management to omit a proposal directing the directors to use excess cash to retire shares of the
company, because it would violate a Delaware statute vesting control of accumulated funds in
the hands of the directors.
51 But cf. DIV. LET., Feb. 2, 1962, where the Division required management to include the stockholder resolution, as revised, proposing the amendment of the by-laws to provide
that certain sales of stock by the directors would make them ineligible for future services as
directors of the company. New York law gave directors authority to select directors subject to
certificate and by-law variations.
52 DIV. LETTERS, April 12 and 17, 1957.
53 DIV. LET., February 17, 1955.
54 COM. MIN., March 24, 1955. In DIV. LET. March 15, 1962, the Division permitted
management to omit mandatory proposals relating to the extension of merchandise discount
cards to the stockholders of the company because under Illinois law the declaring of dividends
is a function of the board and this extension of discount cards was a declaration of dividends
and not a proper subject for shareholder action.
55 See NN, DIV. MEMORANDA, 1958-60.
56 COM. MIN., February 28, 1964.
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that proposals which would be considered improper as directives would be
proper in precatory form under paragraph (c) (1) and could be excluded
from management's proxy material only if they relate to the ordinary business
operations of the issuer. One of the commissioners whose vote for management's omission of this proposal helped carry the day, for management took
a position with respect to (c) (1) similar to the Chairman's argument in 1955
in the case discussed above: matters which under the laws of the state are reserved expressly to the board do not become proper subjects for action by stockholders by the mere rephrasing of the resolution as one of recommendation
or advice.

Where state law, the charter or by-laws of the company require that the
latter two be amended to permit the proposed action, the proponent is faced
with two problems: what form of resolution is proper where the stockholders
can amend the governing instrument, and what form of resolution is proper
for action by security holders where they cannot amend the governing instrument. In the first situation, the Commission, in 1954, held that a resolution
directing the board of directors to take the appropriate action was improper
under the state law since the articles could only be amended by the stockholders, but it permitted the proponent to revise the proposal as a proposed
amendment by the stockholders.5" In 1962, the Commission further held that
a resolution requesting the board to amend the by-laws was improper where
the stockholders had this power, but it permitted the proponent to rephrase
the resolution as a stockholders' amendment.5" In other words, the proper
form of resolution where the stockholders can amend and the amendment is required is a proposed amendment by the stockholders. Note that in each of these
decisions, the proposal was phrased improperly, but the Commission permitted
the proponent to revise. In 1955, the Division refused to permit the proponent
to rephrase five proposals demanding action by the board which could only
be done by amendment of the by-laws by the shareholders,5 9 arguing that:
While in some cases the Comnission has directed the staff to inform
a stockholder whose proposals were not in proper technical form
for inclusion in the proxy material of the necessary changes required, it would appear that recasting of the proposals so as to meet
the requirements of Ohio law would require such extensive legal
advice that it is not practical under the circumstances to make the
appropriate suggestions.6"
In the situation referred to above, where the stockholder cannot amend
the governing instrument and the amendment is necessary, the Commission
held in 1954 that a mandatory resolution to the board of directors was improper,
but if the proposal were revised as a recommendation to the board to carry out
the particular action (which they could do by amending the by-laws), it should
be included.61 Finally, in this area of discussion where state law or the gov57 COM. MIN., July 30, 1954. The original proposal instructed the board of directors to
take appropriate action to amend the necessary instruments to provide that any nominee for a
directorship must own at least 1% of the company's stock.
58 CC, COM. MIN., February 19, 1962.
59 DIV. LET., October 4, 1955.
60 See DIV. MEMO. of October 3, 1955.
61 BB, COM. MIN., March 2, 1954.
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erning corporate instruments require an amendment of the same, a 1961 decision of the Commission did not permit a stockholder to revise a resolution
directing that no officer or director of the company could hold any office with
another company until the stockholder suits against such company were finally
settled. 2 One of the two major reasons was that for such a resolution to be
proper, both the certificate of the company (which specifically provided that
directors of the company could be directors in other corporations) and a bylaw (which required a two-thirds vote by stockholders for removal of a director)
would have to be amended.
The last major problem under general state laws arises where the action
of stockholders under state law, whether it be a major activity like merger or
dissolution or a simple amendment of the articles of incorporation, must be
preceded by certain actions of the board of directors, or at least "initiated"
by the board of directors (by a resolution passed by it declaring the action advisable and submitting it to stockholders). Since such activity, under the Transamerica reasoning, is within the reach of the stockholders under state law, necessary procedural actions which must precede stockholder approval or disapproval should not prevent the basic proposal from reaching the stockholders.
So the question of major significance is what form of proposal is necessary, if
action by the board of directors must precede stockholder action. In 1955, the
Commission required the management of AA to include two advisory proposals
requesting the board of directors to initiate activity towards liquidation and to
initiate necessary steps towards amending the articles, both activities which had
to precede stockholder action in the particular areas. 3 The Commission and
the Division in subsequent decisions6 4 seem to have held that a recommendation or request to the board to do the initial activity is proper. However, in
1959, the Division did not follow this rationale with respect to a proposal submitted to management requesting that the board of directors take such steps
as were necessary to merge the company with another at the exchange ratio of
one of its shares for three shares of the other company. 5 In its memorandum,
the Division noted that, although under the Delaware Code two-thirds of the
stockholders must approve a merger, in this case the proposal attempted to set
the terms and conditions of the merger, an area of corporate management
which is not a proper subject for action by the security holders. It interpreted
the wording of the proposal to be mandatory upon the board, if it
was passed, in view of the fact that it instructs the board "to take such
steps" as may be needed to merge with a particular company on definite
terms. This interpretation and holding is esoteric. Could not the Division have
adopted the approach taken by the Commission in 1954 in the decision discussed below?
In 1954, the Commission, in requiring BB to include, if revised in the
form of a request, a stockholder proposal to increase the number of directors,
62 COM. MIN., March 6, 1961.
63 AA, COM. MINUTES, March 31 and April 4, 1955. See supra notes 45-46, and corresponding text.
64 E.g., DIV. LETTERS, September 2, 1959, and January 5, 1960; DIV. LET., March 8,
1961; and DIV. LET., March 12, 1962.
65 DIV. MEMO., February, 1959.
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seems to have noted that this action required amendment of the by-laws, which
either the board or the stockholders could do, but which the stockholders could
not do without initial action by the board. Since the proposal in original form
was mandatory, it was improper for action by security holders, whether from
board amendment or stockholder amendment viewpoints. So the Commission
permitted inclusion, if the proposal was recast as advisory as to the board
amendment or as to board action necessary for stockholder amendment.6
During the next few years, the Commission and Division failed to follow any
consistent approach when a mandatory proposal was submitted which, to be
binding, required initial action by the board before stockholder approval or
disapproval. In 1955, the Division permitted management to omit the proposal
without providing the proponent with an opportunity to rephrase it as a recommendation or request 7 In 1956, the Commission followed the Division's
1955 approach,"8 while the Division required management to include a proposal
to split the common stock on a two-for-one basis, if in the form of a request
or recommendation. 9 Again in 1957, the Division reverted to its 1955 approach.7" Two years later, the Commission, in a formal proceeding under
Section 12(e) and Rule 62 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, permitted management to omit a mandatory proposal to amend the articles, but
the Commission noted that the proponent "has submitted, and management
proposes to include in its solicitation material, a related proposal in the form
of a resolution calling on the board of directors to adopt and submit to the
stockholders an amendment to the articles to restore preemptive rights.'" 1
Again in 1960, the Commission permitted management to omit the mandatory
72
proposal without giving the proponent an opportunity to revise it.
3. ParticularState Laws Which May Outlaw Proposed Activity
There are state laws which prohibit certain actions, whether by stockholders, board of directors or the corporation, and any resolution, whether in
proper form or not, proposing activity contrary to them is futile. Such laws
have been raised against certain stockholder proposals, but some have been
overcome by the ingenuity of proponents in sidestepping the grasp of such laws.
The first type of proposal affected by state laws is that of the Wilma Soss
type which provides for the use of secret ballots at stockholder meetings in
electing directors and in voting on resolutions. State laws cited against such
a proposal provided stockholders with the right to challenge the vote of another
stockholder, laws giving stockholders the right to challenge an attempted vote
of an excessive number of shares, laws perfecting rights of appraisal by dissenters, and laws giving stockholders the right to change votes at any time
before the result of the balloting is announced. The argument was not that
66 BB, COM. MIN., March 2, 1954.
67 DIV. LET., March 7, 1955. It should be noted that the management included this
proposal in the 1956 proxy statement with the following change: "[s]tockholders hereby
request."
68 COM. MIN., April 2, 1956.
69 DIV. LET., April 20, 1956.
70 DIV. LET., February 18, 1957.
71 SEC Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 13962, March 26, 1959.
72 COM. MIN., April 27, 1960.
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secret balloting was directly contradictory to these rights, but rather that it
would affect the procedures for exercising the ights given under these laws.7
In 1954 and 1956, the Commission permitted the management of NN to omit
an advisory proposal requesting that such method of balloting be provided.7
In 1960, the break came when the Commission held that the following proposal,
submitted to UU, had eliminated the above legal objections and was a proper
subject for action by security holders: that the board of directors take such
steps as may be necessary to provide a secret ballot for stockholders for the
election of directors and for resolutions appearing in the proxy statement
except in specific instances and under specific circumstances where this may
be contrary to existing New Jersey law.7 In 1961, a similar resolution was
presented to AB, but the last part provided "except when secret voting can be
proven specifically contrary to existing State Corporation Law or General
Corporation Law of New York." 76 The Commission required the management to include it after the proponent revised this last part of the proposal to
read as the UU proposal.
The second type of proposal affected by state laws is one prohibiting the
counting of proxies with respect to a resolution unless they are specifically
marked "for" or "against." In 1957, the Commission required the management of SS to include such a resolution subject to certain revisions.77 No serious contentions regarding state laws were raised by management. In 1959,
however, the management of Union Electric Company contended that under
a Missouri statute, the shareholder had a right to give his agent an unsolicited
discretionary proxy to vote all matters presented at a meeting and that this
resolution would contravene the statute. The Commission agreed.7 In 1962,
the management of XYZ argued that such a proposal would constitute an illegal
restraint on the right of a stockholder to give his agent a proxy to vote at the
meeting in contravention of state laws.7 The Commission seems to have accepted the Division's view that the proxy rules do not themselves confer discretionary authority, except with respect to matters which the persons on whose
behalf the solicitation was made were not aware that they would be presented at
the meeting, 0 and that the proposal does not violate the right of the stockholder
under the law to attend the meeting by proxy. But the Commission conditioned
requiring inclusion of the proposal on a revision to make it clear that it referred only to solicited proxies. The revised resolution was held by the Commission not to have been properly revised and management was permitted to
omit it.
Sometimes a state statute will provide the "exclusive remedy" for dissenting stockholders in cases of a sale, consolidation or merger by the company; the Division has held that a proposal, whether mandatory or advisory,
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See AB,DIV. MEMO. of January 30, 1961.
NN, COM. MINUTES, March 22 and 26, 1954, and April 2, 1956.
UU, COM. MINUTES, March 1, 3 and 4, 1960.
AB, COM. MINUTES, January 31 and February 1, 1961.
SS, COM. MIN., March 22, 1957.
See supra note 71.
XYZ, COM. MINUTES, January 24 and February 2, 1962.
See supra note 8, and corresponding text.
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proposing a remedy for the dissenters is a departure from the "exclusive remedy" and is improper."'
Recently, the Commission held that a proposed by-law amendment prohibiting the company from purchasing stock in any other corporation without first
obtaining the consent of the shareholders was in conflict with the articles of
incorporation which authorized the purchase of stock in another corporation,
and, because of this inconsistency, was improper under state law which limited
by-law provisions to such as are "not inconsistent with law or the articles."8 2
The Commission, in formal administrative adjudications, determined that
two proposals, one to amend the by-laws to accord to the father of a minor
stockholder all rights incident to stock ownership which are accorded to stockholders who have reached their majority, and another to amend the by-laws to
permit a minor to vote his stock by a power of attorney, were improper under
Missouri law.8 In a contemporary intermediate court decision between proponent and Union Electric Company, the Missouri court had held that a minor
could not appoint an agent. This was the effect of both of these resolutions.
Where a resolution directs the board of directors to carry into effect immediately another proposal, included by management without objection, which
proposal the Division concludes is not binding upon the management, the subject
resolution may be omitted by management because it, as a direction to the
board, would be a futile and useless act.8 ' This reasoning of the Division in
1959 may appear, at first glance, to miss the point with respect to advisory
resolutions, which because of the law are often not legally binding. But the
first proposal, which in form was mandatory but in effect only advisory, was
the important proposal submitted because it pointed up the desired idea of the
proponent (amendment of the certificate to provide for cumulative voting).
The second resolution was in the nature of a ministerial matter having reference to certain acts of filing and recording an amendment.
In 1958, the Commission permitted the omission of a proposal under two
different provisions of Pennsylvania state law.' The proposal was to amend
the articles to provide for no increase in the number of directors without the
approval of a majority of the stockholders, either at an annual or special meeting. Under Pennsylvania law,"8 amendments could only be proposed by the
board or by petition of holders of not less than ten per cent of shares entitled
to vote thereon, and since this proposal did not come from the board or the
petition of the required ten per cent, the Commission seems to have held that
as a mandate it was improper. Also, under Pennsylvania law, ' there are
quorum requirements for a meeting, and since this proposal is in terms of a
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DIV. LET., January 30, 1962.
COM. MIN., March 3, 1961.
SEC Public Utility Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 13450, April 17, 1957; 13710,
21, 1958; and 13962, March 26, 1959.
DIV. LETTERS, February 27 and March 12, 1959.
PP, COM. MIN., March 31, 1958.
15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2852-802 (1958).
15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2852-503 (1958):
A shareholders' meeting duly called shall not be organized for the transaction of business unless a quorum is present . . . (1) The presence, in
person or by proxy, of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote shall constitute a quorum.
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majority vote of the shareholders, and not in terms of the vote of the shareholdings required for a quorum, it was held by the Commission to be in conflict with the quorum requirements of the law. Again we see an example
of difficult logic, especially with respect to the second reason for permitting
management to omit this proposal. Both objections could easily have been
obviated by a proper revision.'s
4. Propriety of ProposalApart from State Law
Many a proposal has been found to be improper for action by a security
holder, not because there is a specific or general law under which it would be
improper, but because of the subject matter or the circumstances under which
it was submitted. For example, the Division has consistently permitted management to omit stockholder proposals relating to the size and speed of products
produced by them.8" They are rejected as violative of paragraphs (c) (1) and
(c) (5). A proper subject, according to the Division, is a matter involving
the conduct and management of the affairs and business of the corporation which
is of significant interest to stockholders, but which does not relate to its ordinary
business operations."0 One cannot question the assumption that these proposals
relate to the ordinary business operations of these two firms (the size and speed
of their products), but to infer that because of this they are not of significant
interest to stockholders and therefore not proper subjects for action by-stockholders is questionable. Of course, because such proposals do relate to ordinary
business operations, they should be excluded under (c) (5).
Sometimes a proposal may be a proper subject, but because the proposed
action is already being performed or is intended to be performed, the Commission will not require management to include the proposal. 9 Likewise, a proposal
requesting that specific stock options be amended was omitted with the Division's
sanction because these options were binding contracts between the corporation
and the optionees which could not be changed unilaterally by the corporation.92
Also, the Commission has held that where a proposal, otherwise proper, contained references to the SEC or is premised upon the Commissibn's appointing a
committee of investigators, it is improper to the extent of these references. 3
The Commission cannot appoint privately-financed investigating committees or
approve or disapprove of such investigations. A proposal directingthat additional
information be forthcoming from the auditors in the annual report was omitted
with Division sanction because, while auditors can be directed to give some
information, that part of the proposal requiring auditors to state that payments
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See PP,DIV. MEMO. of March 31, 1958.
Were . . . (this) proposal to provide for a vote by shareholdings and otherwise be amenable to state law, this Division would raise no objection.
89 E.g., DIV. LETTERS, March 22, 1955, and March 19, 1958; DIV. LET., May 1, 1958.
90 See DIV. MEMO. of March 11, 1955.
91 In COM. MIN., February 13, 1959, the Commission required the management to indude a proposal requesting the board to furnish the shareholders certain information unless it
appeared from the company's preliminary proxy material that the full information called for
had been provided. In DIV. LET., March 23, 1960, and DIV. LET., May 26, 1961, the Division permitted management to omit the submitted proposals because the question was moot or
because of management's representation as to its intentions.
92 DIV. LET., December 5, 1956.
93 SS, COM. MIN., March 22, 1957.
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by the company to "nonexistent" employees were bona fide was held to be beyond the scope of an auditor's functions. Because of this, the whole proposal
was held to be improper. 4 It is questionable that the first part of the information demanded was so closely related to the last part that the whole proposal
should fail.
The Commission and the Division have also omitted proposals which
involved matters held not to be proper for shareholder action. In 1956, the
Division sanctioned the omission of a proposal which had been made at the
previous annual meeting of stockholders and which requested that a proxy
statement include a list of all nominees for directorships because such a list was
not proper matter to be included in a proxy statement for a subsequent annual
meeting.95 The Commission in 1961 sanctioned the omission by management
of a proposal requesting that the stockholders be given the right to vote the
stock AB owned in a subsidiary, because the proposal involved a matter which
was the prerogative of management." The next year, the Commission permitted
management to omit a proposal requesting that no payments be made to brokerage houses for solicitation of proxies from accounts held in street names under
certain conditions.9 7 One of the two reasons for the action was that this matter,
as recognized by Rule 14a-2(b) (2), is the business of the exchanges."
5. General Remarks About Rulings on Form of Proposals
As noted in the above cases analyzed in the discussion of proposed stockholder actions under II.A2, the form of the proposal (i.e., whether advisory or
mandatory) is controlling as to whether a proposal is a proper subject, under
the laws of the issuer's domicile, for action by security holders. While in many
instances the Commission and the Division have permitted proponents to revise
proposals into proper forms, this action has not been consistent. Here it is hoped
to take one last look at what might be called some landmark cases in which both
the Division and the Commission addressed themselves to the propriety of the
proposal's form.
First, the Commission has permitted management to omit stockholder
proposals because important parts are not definite enough to be proper subject
matter for action by security holders. Secret balloting at stockholder meetings
was rejected by the Commission on this basis (as well as the law basis discussed
earlier)." The Commission found the following part of the proposal "not
definite enough": the shareowners request our board of directors to take such
steps as may be necessary to amend company's articles or by-laws to provide that
in the election of directors and with respect to each resolution to be voted upon,
shareowners can vote in private by secret ballot instead of voting by ballot
open to the inspection of management and other persons, and such steps may
include further study by impartial counsel as to ways and means to implement
this (paraphrased to remove non-essential terms). In 1957, the Commission in
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DIV. LET., October 4, 1955.
DIV. LET., February 24, 1956.
AB, COM. MINUTES, January 31 and February 1, 1961.
AB, COM. MIN., February 8, 1962.
The second reason for exclusion was 8(c) (5).
NN, COM. MIN., April 2, 1956. See supra note 74, and corresponding text.
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formal administrative proceedings permitted Union Electric Company to omit
a proposal directing the board of directors to set up a so-called office of stockholder relations headed by a "Stockholder Relations Officer."' 0 0 The Commission gave as its sole grounds for the exclusion the fact that the proposal
"as drafted and submitted to the company, is so vague and indefinite as to
make it impossible for either the board of directors or the stockholders at large
to comprehend precisely what the proposal would entail."' 0 ' And again in
1958, the Commission permitted the omission of a mandatory proposal submitted to PP because it was both vague and violative of (c) (5)."2 However,
the ruling of vagueness was not so well taken as in the two previous decisions. The
proposal, evidently, was not deemed vague as a whole, but rather the important
term "major holdings" was felt to be fundamentally indefinite. The proposal
called for the amendment of the articles to provide for a majority vote of security
holders before any sale or disposition of "major holdings."
Second, the Commission and the Division have permitted the proponent
to correct vague and indefinite proposals as well as to remove parts of proposals
which are improper under applicable state law. The landmark case is the SS
decision in 1957.10 The proposals submitted covered such things as investigating, voting only specifically-marked proxies, and furnishing the proponent
a list of stockholders.'
Each of these proposals was eventually included after
revision to remove such defects as improper references to the SEC and improper procedure for counting of proxies under Michigan law. The Commission Minute instructed the Division to advise the proponent and the company
that:
[N]o objection would be made to the omission of the proponent's
resolutions, as submitted, from the management's proxy statement
for the reason that specified proposals therein are improper, but
that the proponent be afforded an opportunity to recast the resolutions so as to exclude the improper and that, if this is done by a
specified date, the management should be required to include the
revised resolutions in the proxy statement.
It was understood that the Division would follow this policy
in its future administration of Rule X-14A-8(c), subject to the
exercise of proper administrative0 5discretion to maintain flexibility
in the administration of the rule.
To judge the effect of this specific admonition to secure to the proponent
the chance of correcting the form which renders improper his proposal, one
can only view it in relation to other situations where the Commission and the
Division have not given the proponent this opportunity. In the Union
Electric Company and PP decisions, the proposals were short and vague,
and the changes needed could not have been made by removal, but only by
addition which might require a near impossible simulation of the proponent's
100 SEC Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 13450, April 17, 1957.
101 Id. at 8.

102 PP, COM. MIN., March 31, 1958.
103 SS, COM. MIN., March 22, 1957.
104 See supra note 31, and corresponding text.
105 E.g., COM. MINUTES, May 2 and 5, 1961; DIV. LET., February 1, 1962 (see supra
note 51) ; DIV. LET., February 16, 1962 (see supra note 64) ; and CC, COM. MIN., February
19, 1962.
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intentions. In the three proposals in this SS decision, all were verbose and
detailed, and the changes required deletion, not addition.'
One further word
might be added to show when "administrative discretion" might be used to
refuse a proponent an opportunity to revise his resolution, even though the form
of the proposal could easily be corrected by revision rather than addition. Ten
years ago the Division had a proponent with four proposals badly in need
of revision, although some of them were possibly proper subjects for action
by security holders. It permitted the management to omit all."
We have contended in past cases that if a proposal is unsuitable
for inclusion in proxy material because so poorly constructed that
stockholders would not understand what they were being asked to
vote upon, the proponent should be so advised and invited to recast his proposal. This is not recommended in this case. The Division has had considerable correspondence from and with the proponent. We have tried to answer his inquiries to the extent of our
knowledge, the information we have in our files, and our understanding of his rather confused requests, but he has been dissatisfied
and quarrelsome. It does not appear from our knowledge that efforts to assist him in drawing up proper proposals would produce
any useful result. 08
6. Burden of Proof
When Rule 14a-8 was last revised in 1954, the Commission specifically
noted that subsection (d):
places the burden of proof upon the management to show that
a particular shareholder's proposal is not a proper one for inclusion
in management's proxy material. Where management contends
that a proposal may be omitted because it is not proper under
state law, it will be incumbent upon management to refer to the
applicable statute or case law and furnish a supporting opinion of
counsel. 09
As will be seen below, where this required burden has not been met in some
cases, the Commission has acted to require inclusion of the proposal. But
there are some questions about the Division's proper enforcement of this burden. In a speech given to the Society of Corporate Secretaries in June,
1960, the former Chairman of the SEC, Edward N. Gadsby said:
[I]n most of these cases (claiming the proposal to be illegal under
state law) we are amply supplied with opinions as to the propriety
106

In AB, COM. MIN., February 26, 1964, the Commission affirmed the Division's posi-

tion that management might omit the stockholder proposals, but the staff was instructed to
explain to the stockholder that his major purpose of getting the management to develop a stock
purchase plan was not objectionable, but that the form of his proposal (vague, indefinite and
not reasonably subject to suggestions) was. Note that the Commission Minutes did not disclose
that such instruction was given to the staff.
107 DIV. LET., March 17, 1954. The four proposals read: (1) That in view of the reduction of earnings and losses sustained, since 1948, that the salaries of the president, and other
executives be reduced, as unreasonable, excessive and out of proportion to their services and
the results in earnings to the corporation; (2) That Mr ....
and Mrs ....
return to the company common stock and stock dividends received by them, and for which they have not paid
with their own funds, and not by way of dividends; (3) That stockholders be specifically
notified that they have the right of cumulative voting, and should elect directors who can better
manage the corporation; and (4) That the stock issued to Mr.... and Mrs ....
was not
registered with the SEC pursuant to the 1933 Act.
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or impropriety of the particular stockholder request, but, more frequently than not, counsel is unable to furnish us with a citation to
controlling authority . .. the administration of this aspect of our
proxy rules would quickly fall into hopeless confusion if we relied
solely upon the arguments and opinions of counsel. We have found
that, in most instances, it is necessary for the Commission to make
an independent analysis of the proposal and of its probable legal
effect under the appropriate state laws."10
It cannot be doubted that the Division does make an independent analysis
of the state laws, but in few of the many memoranda that come from the
Division to the Commission or from the branch attorney to the assistant directom or the Chief Counsel of the Division is this question of "burden of proof"
treated. It was sometimes found that the burden of proof of management
could not reasonably be considered to have been sustained with respect to the
impropriety of the proposal. In 1955, the Division permitted management to
omit a rather unusual proposal relating to the dismissal of the chairman of the
board.11 Management argued that the proposal could be omitted because it
applied to the election to office, because the by-laws made provision for the
election of the chairman, and, because according to an opinion of counsel
under the laws of New York, the proposal was not a proper subject for action
by stockholders. This opinion of counsel was a short one-paragraph letter
which did not cite one authority. Yet the Division memorandum and letter
to the company seem to indicate that management may omit the proposal because of the above reasons. 2 The Division should not have sanctioned the
omission under (c) (1) because management, through a meaningless opinion of
counsel, had failed to accomplish the first requirements of its burden of proof,
i.e., "refer to the applicable statute or case law.""'
In 1959 and 1960, the Commission in landmark decisions required
management to include proposals which were vigorously attacked by companies' counsel as improper under state law. One resolution submitted to
management directed amendment of that company's by-laws to authorize
cumulative voting, but counsel contended that the certificate of incorporation
did not permit cumulative voting and that any amendment of the by-laws
would be of no legal effect. However, after extensive research, the Division
found that Maine law provided that the by-laws shall govern as to methods
of voting, and that the attorney general of Maine had recognized that a certificate provision on this subject had no legal effect. In its letter to the company stating the Commission's decision, the Division noted that management had not met its burden of proof and that because of this and the view
that doubts in regard to the propriety of shareholder proposals should be
resolved in favor of their inclusion, management could not properly omit the
proposal.'" In the Commission's decision in 1960 requiring UU to include
the secret ballot proposal, the General Counsel's memorandum to the, Com110

191 CoM. AND FINANcIAL CHRONICLE 1825 (1960).

III DIV. LET., August 9, 1955.
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See DIV. MEMO. of August 8, 1955.
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E.g., DIV. LET., January 17, 1955; DIV. LET., April 20, 1956.

114 COM. MIN., March 30, 1959; see DIV. MEMO. of March 27,' 1959, and LET. of
March 31, 1959.
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mission, which seems to have influenced the decision most, noted that management had not successfully carried its burden of proof. This memorandum
specifically defined this burden in the context of Rule 14a-8(d) to be a showing that the stockholder "resolution is dearly seeking something in the nature
'
of a nullity." 5
B. Proposal Relates to Conduct of Ordinary Business Operations of Issuer
In the discussion above under II.A, it was noted that many of the proposals
prior to 1954 relating to business matters which under governing law were under
the management of the board of directors were included in the proxy material of management if in the form of a recommendation or request and that
many of these same proposals, in the layman's language, were concerned with
the "ordinary business operations" of the company. In the 1954 amendment
to the proxy rules, these proposals were considerably affected by a new Rule
14a-8(.) (5) which permitted management's omission of a proposal "if the
proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take
action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the issuer."
In 1954, soon after the adoption of this amendment to the proxy rules,
the Commission had occasion to discuss 8(c) (5) when a union presented the
following proposal to AB: that stockholders recommend for the consideration
of the board of directors the elimination of the company practice of reducing
retired employees' pensions by one-half or any part of the benefits received
by such retired employees under the Social Security Act. The Commission held
that management could omit the proposal under new paragraph (c) (5)."'8
Each Commissioner had a comment, and there was one dissent. Two, in
particular, held that since such plans under federal and state law were the
subject of collective bargaining, their character seemed to be within the realm
of wages, a subject which was under state law exclusively committed to the
board of directors and therefore within the realm of ordinary business operation. This reasoning, and that of others in the majority, could be stated in the
following manner: a proposal relating to a subject exclusively within the board
of directors' activities under state law relates to "ordinary business operations"
within the meaning of (c) (5). By "exclusively within the board of directors'
activities under state law," the Commission does not seem to have made reference to a statute specifically stating that wages are within the control of
the board, but evidently was referring to the broad state statutes which provide
that the business of the company shall be managed by the board of directors.
If this is what they meant, their reasoning is not sound, since those broad state
statutes permit restrictions on this authority by the certificate of incorporation
and include activities which no one using common sense can call "ordinary
business operations." The Commission approved similar reasoning of the
Division with respect to another proposal relating to wages of executives submitted in 1959.7 That proposal requested the board to make two changes in
a stock option plan. The Division noted that stockholder action was neither
115
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March 4, 1960.

116 AB, COM. MINUTES, February 10, 12, 16 and 19, and March 3, 1954.
117 COM. MIN., March 13, 1959.
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initially sought nor required and that it was nothing but an aspect of executive
compensation entrusted by Pennsylvania law to the board of directors and
thus excludable under 8 (c) (5)."' It is doubtful that this classifying of
amendments to stock option plans as relating to ordinary business operations
is valid.
While discussing this logically unpersuasive reasoning, one should note
the Commission's decision with respect to a proposal submitted to PP in 1958."
The proposal, which was a mandatory amendment of the articles to require
approval of security holders for any sale or disposition of "major holdings,"
was omitted because it was too vague to be a proper subject for action by
security holders120 and encroached upon actions which are exclusively the
prerogative of management and thus within the purview of (c) (5). The
Division's memorandum to the Commission did not disclose any specific
statute giving power with respect to this subject exclusively to the management, so again the Division must have made reference to the general type of
state statute referred to in the preceding paragraph. But notwithstanding the
basis of the statement that the subject was exclusively within the prerogative
of management, such a subject still does not necessarily relate to "ordinary
business operations." 1 '
However, an observation is necessary with respect to the subject matter
which is considered to be within the area of "ordinary business operations"
under the reasoning of the 1954 AB decision. Excluding the questionable
logic, it cannot be doubted that the Commission has determined in many cases
that proposals whose subject matter involved compensation of executives (excluding directors) and employees in such forms as restrictions on wages, stock
option plans and pension plans relate to matters concerning the conduct of
ordinary business operations. 12' But notwithstanding such Division and Commission determinations, management has included similar proposals without
objection. These are not discussed in this paper."2
In 1955, the Commission went a step further in its interpretation of 8 (c) (5)
in approving the Division's recommendation with respect to a proposal submitted
to AA.124 It held that even though the proposal was a proper subject for action
by security holders under New Jersey laws and also within the power of stockholders as a proposed amendment to the articles of incorporation, it was
excludable under 8(c) (5) because it was concerned with the ordinary busi118 See DIV. MEMO. of March 11, 1959.
119 PP, COM. MIN., March 31, 1958.
120 See supra note 85, and corresponding text.
121 See PP, DIV. MEMO. of March 31, 1958.
122 E.g., DIV. LETTERS AND MEMORANDA, February 14, 1955, February 24, 1956,
February 13, 1958, February 17, 1959, and COM. MIN., March 17, 1961. The three types of
proposals involved in these series of decisions were: to amend the pension plan so that it becomes a portable pension for aging employees who are left out before they become eligible for
pension, or to change it from a non-contributory to a contributory plan; to resubmit the entire
pension plan to stockholders for reconsideration; and to provide pensions for an employee discharged due to liquidation of a plant. But see COM. MINUTES, March 15 and 21, 1960, where
the Division recommended that a proposal requesting the board of directors to reduce compensation of executives whose aggregate compensation exceeded $50,000 until a cash dividend was
paid be included because the effect of the proposal was to limit compensation of two directors
only, so that proposal was not within 8(c) (5). Note that the company decided to include this
before the Commission's decision.
123 See 22 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 103-4 (1956) and similar data in subsequent reports.
124 AA, COM. MINUTES, March 31 and April 4, 1955.
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ness operations of the issuer. In this decision, the subject of the proposal was
a request to amend the articles of incorporation to restrict the board in making
any new investments in ships or shipping enterprise without first obtaining
shareholder approval.'25 This holding has withstood attack until recently.12
In 1961, the Division held:
[W]e are not prepared to conclude that a matter which the courts
have held to be- a proper subject for a shareholder's proposal
to amend the by-laws is a matter relating to the conduct of the
ordinary business operations of the issuer within the meaning of Rule
14a-8(c) (5) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'1
The proposal directed reductions in salaries of all officers until a dividend
was paid. Directors under the by-laws could fix the compensation of officers.
But the shareholders could amend these by-laws under New York law. The
Division, however, permitted management to exclude it unless the proposal was
revised as an appropriate proposal to amend the by-laws.
Certain observations in the Division's memoranda concerning the meaning of the phrase "ordinary business operations" are worth noting. In 1954,
the Division, in disregarding management's 8(c) (5) argument, stated that
the phrase "ordinary business operations" was not necessarily synonymous with
the phrase used by the company "within the usual and normal functions of
the Board.""' 8 The proposal in this case, which management had to include,
requested the board of directors to consider the advantages of a sale or merger. The Division noted that such a consideration might be within the usual
functions of the board, but it did not relate to the ordinary business operations of
the issuer. In 1960, the Division objected to the contention of the proponents that a policy of pricing the corporation's product was of such importance
that it was not an "ordinary business operation."' 29 In fact, the Division observed that the phrase "ordinary business operations" refers to the area or
scope of activities and not to the significance or importance of such activities.' 30
The Commission in 1955 held that a proposal requesting the board of directors of AA to make an investigation of a sale by the company of its holdings
in a steamship company should be included in management's proxy material.'
The Commission approved the Division's memorandum which stated that, as to
management's argument under 8(c) (5), an investigation per se is not within
32
the ordinary business operations of the issuer.
C. Proposal Substantially the Same as Previously Submitted to Security Holders
in Management's Proxy Statement for Stockholder Meetings Held Within
Preceding Five Years and at Which it Received Less Than the Required
Percentage of Total Votes Cast
125 In this same decision, a similar proposal to prohibit the Board and the company officers
from making contracts or agreements with insiders pertaining to ships or shipping investments
was held to be a proper subject for action by stockholders and not excludable under 8(c) (5).
126 E.g., DIV. LET., March 22, 1955; COM. MINUTES, February 18 and 24, 1958.
127 DIV. LET., January 19, 1961.
128 DIV. LET., March 23, 1954; see DIV. MEMO. of March 17, 1954.
129 DIV. LET., March 23, 1960.
130 See DIV. MEMO. of March 18, 1960.
131 AA, COM. MINUTES, March 31 and April 4, 1955.
132 See AA, DIV. MEMO. of March 30, 1954.
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As discussed -under I., this reason for omitting a stockholder proposal first
appeared in the Rule in 1948. In 1954, with the last amendment to the Rule,
this specific part was expanded and became paragraph (c) (4).
The most important part of this provision relates to the phrase "substantially the same proposal." In 1955, the Division held that a proposal requesting the board of directors to take the necessary steps to reduce the term
of each director from five to two years was not substantially the same proposal
as an earlier one which would have completely abolished the staggered system
of electing classes of directors as well as having reduced.the term of each director. 3 In other words, a proposal that does not go as far as another in
the same area is not substantially the same. But in 1962, the' Division permitted management to omit a proposal directing the board of directors to replace the present stock option plan.'34 It held the proposal to be substantially
similar to another submitted to the stockholders the year before which would
have abolished the present stock plan, because the proposed substitute plan
would of course require suspension of the present stock option plan. It could
be argued that this decision is inconsistent with that of 1955 since the proposal
of an affirmative plan went further than the previous one.
The Division has rejected management's argument that a present proposal
is substantially the same as d previous one because the purpose of both was
identical.Y 5 The previous proposal had been with respect to cumulative voting;
the later requested an increase in the number of directors. The Division noted
in its memorandum that:
The phrase "substantially the same proposal" would appear to
mean a proposal that is alike in scope and effect. The purpose for
submitting a proposal does not appear to be material. There may..
be two means to accomplish the same objective but that would not
necessarily constitute both means alike or the same. Furthermore,
it is conceivable that stockholders may disapprove one means
to accomplish a given objective and still approve another means to
accomplish the same objective because the results are different.23 6
The Commission approved -the Division's recommendation in 1962 and
rejected management's argument that a proposal submitted by a stockholder
to abolish a stock option plan was the same proposal presented by management
to stockholders in two previous years for the adoption of the same plan and
that the favorable vote for the plan at those times was a defeat for the proponent's proposal. 3 '
A typical example of proposals which have been held by the Division
to be substantially the same is a proposal in 1962 and 1963 to set a limit on
individual executive compensation at $200,000, and another in 1964 to set
a limit of $250,000.Y8
133 DIV. LET., January 21, 1955.
134 DIV. LETTERS, February 6 and April 10, 1962.
135 DIV. LET., January 14, 1955.
136 See DIV. MEMO. of December 27, 1954.
137 XYZ, COM. MINUTES, January 24 and February 2, 1962. See supra note 79, and
corresponding text.
138 DIV. MEMO., March 4, 1964. The argument was used even though the proponent in
1964 was not the same person or persons who submitted the proposal in 1962 and 1963.
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In 1957 through 1959, the Commission, with respect to Union Electric
Company's proxy statement, noted the contention put forth by Dyer, a stockholder proponent, that:
[M]any of the proxies voted against the proposals in prior years
were invalid since they were "unmarked", that is to say, the forms
of proxy contained boxes in which the signing stockholder might indicate by a check mark a vote for or against each proposal and no
check mark was made in either box. Management voted the proxies
against the proposals pursuant to the express authorization on the
face of the form of proxy in boldface type if a choice for or against
was not specified the proxy would be voted against the Dyer proposas ...
But, continued the Commission:
Rule 14a-4(b) specifically permits such a proviso and we find
nothing in the circumstances of this case to require a different result here. We must therefore reject Dyer's contention, as we have
twice before rejected similar contentions by him.13 9
D. Proponent Must Submit Proposal to Management a Reasonable Time
Before Solicitation is Made
Rule 14a-8(a) sets up a test for determining whether a proposal has been
submitted to management a reasonable time before the solicitation is made.
A proposal so submitted with respect to an annual meeting more than
,60 days in advance of a day corresponding to the first date on which
management proxy soliciting material was released to security
holders in connection with the last annual meeting of security
holders shall prima faie be deemed to have been submitted a reasonable time before the solicitation.
Prior to the 1954 amendment of the proxy Rule, the period had been thirty
days.
Generally, the Commission and the Division have held that a submission within the sixty-day period is not prima facie unreasonable. 4 ' However,
in 1956, the Division seems to have approved management's argument that
a submission fifteen days prior to the mailing date for that year and eighteen
days prior to the prior year's mailing date was not reasonable.' 4" The Division
has permitted omission for late submission (sole reason) where the definitive
proxy form has already gone to the press or is due to go.' 42 The Commission specifically permitted omission of a proposal submitted only fifteen days before the
mailing date because of the hardship to management which might have resulted
since, if the proposal would have been adopted, it might have caused some
of the management's nominees to be disqualified. 43

139 SEC Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 13962, March 26, 1959.
140 E.g., BB, COM. MIN., March 2, 1954 (Proposal was submitted 38 days prior to previous mailing date); DIV. LETTERS, March 7 and 24, and April 6, 1955 (Proposal was
submitted 35 days prior to previous mailing date); DIV. LET., March 4, 1958 (Proposal was
received by management 2 days after preliminary proxy material was sent to SEC); and see
DIV. MEMO. of February 7, 1964 (Proposal was submitted 46 days prior to previous mailing
date).
141 DIV. LET., January 13, 1956 (The proposal was omitted on other grounds also).
142 DIV. MEMO., December 6, 1961.
143 COM. MIN., March 21, 1961.
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Where the proponent had known of a special meeting long enough to
have presented a proposal sooner, the Commission held that the proposal
Likewise, the Commission has held that a subwas not timely submitted."
mission by a stockholder within the sixty days was timely, though yery late,
when management had full knowledge of the subject matter of the proposal.' 45
In 1960, management contended that a proposal directing .that the
company's stock be listed on the American Stock Exchange was not timely
submitted because the proposal was not received by management twenty
days before the preliminary proxy material was to be sent to the Commission.
Management argued that under Rule 14a-8(d), management is supposed
to file a statement for omission at least twenty days before preliminary material is filed, so the proposal must be received by the company more than
twenty days prior to the proposed preliminary copies-filing date. 4 The Commission, in approving the recommendation of the Division, rejected this argument.147
A stockholder presented a proposal requesting the board of directors to
augment the board to the full number authorized under the by-laws, including at least one woman. Management objected that the proposal was to advance
the special cause of the Federation of Women Shareholders in American Business, Inc., and therefore was excludable under Rule 14a-8(c) (2). The -Commission accepted the argument of management in a two-to-one decision.'4 8
The proponent submitted a revised proposal, but the Commission again, by
the same margin, permitted management to omit. In so voting, the Chairman and one other commissioner expressed the view that the proposal as revised:
although a proper one for inclusion in management's proxy 'material, was a different proposal from one originally submitted and
that, since counsel for management had not had .an opportunity
to determine or argue his position on the merits, the Commission
should not at this late date require the management to include the
proposal in its material.' 49
This second decision, if applied across the board could sustain the omission
of any revised proposals submitted by stockholders.' 50
III. An Evaluation of SEC Administration of Amended Portions of Rule 14a'-8
A. 14a-8(c)(1) and 14a-8(c) (5)
Probably, the criticisms that can be directed to the SEC administration
of these two substantive rules which exclude stockholder proposals that are not
proper subjects for shareholder action under state law and those that relate
to the ordinary business operations of the issuer can be categorized in the following manner: inconsistent administration, poor substantive law, and failure
fully to inform outsiders of its informal decisions under these pro'vsions.144
145
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COM. MINUTES, October 10 and 11, 1955. See supra note 43, and corresponding text.
E.g., COM. MINUTES, March 4 and 5, 1958; COM. MIN., January 6, 1959.
See DIV. MEMO. of October 5, 1960, and counsel's letter of September 27, 1960.
COM. MIN., September 30, 1960.
AB, COM. MINUTES, January 31 and February 1, 1961.
See AB, COM. MIN., of February 1, 1961.
See DIV. LET., of January 3, 1957.
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1. Inconsistent Administration
In amending Rule 14a-8 (c) (1) in 1954 to provide specifically that state
law- was to be the eligibility standard of a proposal under the Rule, the Commission noted that it wished "to make it clear that it considers this standard
consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of SEC v.
Transamerica Corporation."' Thus, the approaches of the Third Circuit
to using state law in interpreting the propriety of stockholder proposals should
have guided the SEC in its administration of 8(c) (1) since 1954. But such
approaches have only partially been followed and then sometimes inconsistently.
For example, in the Transamerica case, the Court reasoned that a subject matter, such as the election of an independent public auditor, which was
not felt to be peculiarly within the discretion of the board of directors could
be submitted to a stockholder vote as a by-law amendment or as a mandate
to the board, even though a state statute entrusted the management of the
business to the board of directors. 2 But the Division in 1955 and 1960 ignored such reasoning and excluded two proposals using the following contrary rationale: under such a general statute entrusting management to the
board of directors, for the shareholders to act in this business area, the certificate or by-laws must so provide or be amended to so provide. Because the
two proposals respectively, directed management to submit all major decisions
to shareholders for their approval and to engage in a study of diversification,
the Division permitted management to omit them. 5 First, this reasoning
was not consistent with the Transamerica approach, which the 1954 amendment of 8(c) (1) was not to have changed. Secondly, if the Division did not
feel that this reasoning applied to these particular subject matters, its refusal to
permit the proponents to amend the proposals into precatory form was not
consistent with a Commission decision in 1955 where management was required to include two proposals for investigations of past contracts, if revised
in the form of a request to management.' 5 '
A second example of inconsistent administration by the SEC of 8(c) (1)
as amended occurs after its determination of the impropriety of the proposal.
At that stage of its decision, it could do as the Division did in the two decisions
discussed above, which was to permit management to omit the proposal without informing the stockholder of a possible revision of the form from mandatory to advisory or from mandatory or advisory to a proposed amendment of
the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the company. Sometimes the Commission or Division refuses to give a stockholder the opportunity to revise the
form of his proposal. 55 But in 1954 and 1955, the Commission set a precedent, consistent with its prior administration, of giving this opportunity to
5
proponents.

Finally, there is a serious question as to whether the Division or the Com151
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SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4947, January 6, 1954.
See supra note 22, and corresponding text.
See supra notes 46-48, and corresponding text.
See supra note 37, and corresponding text.
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See supra notes 37 and 66, and corresponding text.
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mission has properly, enforced the burden of proof placed upon an objecting
management using the 8(c) (1) argument. As was disclosed above, this burden of proof on the part of the opinion of counsel for management, which is
required by paragraph (d) of Rule 14a-8, as amended in 1954, requires as a
starting point that the opinion cite statute or case law of the particular state to
support the opinion. But the Division in some instances has ignored this very
basic starting point.15 One possible reason for such failure to enforce this
legal requirement is that sometimes a branch chief or examiner who handles
the material for the Chief Counsel's office is not an attorney and may fail to
recognize or even know about the burden of proof requirement."'8
2. Poor Substantive Law
Certain decisions of the Commission itself have produced weak law. An
example is the 1955 decision, reaffirmed in 1964 by a split Commission, that a
proposal respecting the declaration of dividends is not a proper subject for shareholder action under SEC law, notwithstanding what the highest court of a state
had said about subjects available for a non-binding shareholder vote." 9
3. FailureFully to Inform the Outsiders
The Division's approach to informing proponents and management as to
its or the Commission's decision in the particular case is not sufficiently precise in many cases. Usually, in situations where management is permitted to
omit the proposal from its proxy material, the letter to the proponent and
the management merely states the proposal, management's arguments, and
the fact that management may omit the proposal.', If management must
include the proposal, the letter often merely states the proposal and the fact
that management must include the proposal. 11 In those situations where the
proponent is given the opportunity to revise the proposal, the letter may be
more informative.
Certainly, the inconsistent use of certain basic precedents in the determination of the propriety or impropriety of a proposal may not have led to stockholder suppression in all instances, but in the case of a less well-informed and
non-professional proponent (the professionals are given better treatment in
some cases), the inconsistent treatment certainly is a handicap. For instance, the
failure of the SEC to let a stockholder revise a proposal, when precedent would
call for such action, may result, if the Division fails to disclose what is wrong
with the form, in an inability to exercise the right properly."' The narrow
157 See supra notes 111-3, and corresponding text.
158 E.g., in COM. MIN., November 13, 1963, the Division had told the proponent that his
proposal could be omitted under 8(c) (1), but the Commission overruled that reason and held
that because the proposal was the opposite of management's proposal it should be omitted. This
was in accordance with prior holdings of the Commission. No attorney from the staff was
present at this Commission meeting. This situation was recorded by this writer who was present
at these Commission meetings.
159 See supra notes 54-56, and corresponding text.
160 E.g., DIV. LET., October 4, 1955; DIV. LET., January 31, 1956, and MEMO. of
February 6, 1956; and DIV. MEMO. of February 13, 1958, and LET. of February 21, 1958.
161 E.g., DIV. MEMO. of April 1, 1954, and LET. of April 22, 1954; and DIV. LET. of
April 3, 1959.
162 E.g., In AB, DIV. MEMO. of February 25, 1964, and COM. MIN. of February 26,
1964, the Commission affirmed the Division's position that the management might omit the
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view consistently taken by the Commission with respect to the declaration of
dividends is probably not good precedent, and it, like the other criticized administrative approaches under amended 8(c)(1) and 8(c)(5), could be
said to have resulted in less individual or representative shareholder participation in corporate affairs."'
B. 14a-8(c)(4) and 14a-8(a)
In disclosing in II.C and D above the SEC approach to technical limitations on resubmissions of substantially similar proposals and its approach to
the prima facie reasonable time submission requirement, this author did not
statistically attempt to show how often the Commission or Division sanctioned
omission of proposals under these provisions. But a long and rather complete
perusal of this area does not suggest that the SEC has permitted these stringencies of 1954 origin to affect substantively good proposals except where the
resubmission or submission is in literal compliance with the reason for omission.
For example, the rationale of the Commission in the last situation discussed
above under II. D has not resulted in a rule of thumb which can be used to
make meaningless stockholder revisions of the form of otherwise proper proposals.1" 4 Of course, the more onerous technical limitations on resubmissions
which had their origin in 1954 may result in some proposals being omitted after
successive submissions in which the proponent failed to receive the 3-6-10 per
cent of votes cast, but the Division and Commission have not permitted management to stretch the requirement that the proposal be substantially the same
to reach unrelated proposals. 6 Thus, it does not appear that the limitations in
8(c) (4) and the sixty-day prima facie submission requirement have become
instruments of shareholder suppression.
IV. Proposals for Effective and Consistent Administration
of Rule 14a-8
None of these proposals is for the amendment of Rule 14a-8. The rule
is complicated enough, and with the Securities Act Amendments of 1964"'
stockholder proposal, but the Division was instructed to explain to the stockholder that his
major purpose of getting management to develop a periodic stock purchase plan was not objectionable, but that the form of the proposal (vague, indefinite and not reasonably subject to
suggestions) was. Whether the Division so informed the proponent is not known, but the Commission minutes do not disclose such advice to the staff (see supra note 106, and corresponding
text). In COM. MIN., of November 13, 1963, the Division had told the proponent that his
proposal could be omitted under 8(c) (1), but the Commission overruled that reason and held
that because the proposal was the opposite of management's proposal it should be omitted. The
Commission instructed the Division to indicate this reason to the proponent, but the Comission minutes did not record this instruction. The Division did not send a letter to the proponent; they did send a telegram which did not indicate any reason for the Commission's
decision (see supra note 160, and corresponding text). The instructions of the Commission
to the Division in these two cases were recorded by this writer who was present at these Commission meetings.
163 In the 1956 fiscal year, the management of twenty companies omitted from their statements, under Rule 14a-8, a total of forty-one stockholder proposals tendered by twenty-six individual stockholders. 22 SEC ANN. REP. 103-04 (1956). In the 1963 fiscal year, the management of twenty-six companies omitted from their proxy statements, under Rule 14a-8, a total of
sixty-one proposals submitted by forty-five individual stockholders. 29 SEC ANN. REP. 54
(1963).
164 See supra note 66, and corresponding text.
165 See supra notes 135-37, and corresponding text.
166 See supra note 1.

THE AMENDED STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE

expected to bring approximately 2,000 to 3,000 more issuers under the proxy
rules and Rule 14a-8 in the next few years, a more complicated stockholder
proposal Rule would only result in less shareholder use of the Rule."'7 Rather,
it is suggested that the informal process of decision-making under this Rule
be continued with three modifications or improvements to insure that the Rule
is used more effectively by stockholders (especially the non-professionals) and
managements of companies subject to it.
A. Fully Inform the Outsider
The stockholder who submits the proposal and the management which
opposes its inclusion should always be accurately informed of the Commission
or Division position. Often, management will throw the whole book of objections at a particular stockholder proposal, and later the staff's letter to both
concerned parties will only inform them that the Division or Commission will
raise no objections if management omits the stockholder proposal from its
proxy material or that the Division or Commission finds no reason for the
omission of the stockholder proposal by management from its proxy material. "
Such general, uninformative statements are often of no aid to the stockholder
concerned, and such refusal by the staff to indicate the grounds of the decision may frustrate the full achievement of the ultimate aim of the proxy
provision, "true corporate democracy.' 16e
Consideration should also be given to issuing a periodic public release
setting forth the type of stockholder proposals which the Commission has seen
fit to include or exclude."", The Commission has developed a wealth of information as to matters which are of interest to stockholders, as demonstrated
by the subject matter classification below. Further clarification by a public
release of the permissible scope of proposals, under 8(c) (1), would also be
a valuable guide to the courts as well as to corporate management in determining which proposals are required to be included in proxy statements.
B. Better Supervision by a Top Staff Attorney
Although some of this material dealing with contested Rule 14a-8 proposals is examined by the Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance,
instances of non-attorneys actually determining state law questions under
8(c) (1), checking the legal opinions of management attorneys, and making
policy decisions under 8(c) (5) have been noted.' 71 Such instances should be
167 Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1964, p. 4, col. 4.
168 See supra notes 160-61, and corresponding text.
169 See supra note 162, and corresponding text.
170 TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Appendix N) 14748 (1949):
The Commission [S.E.C.] gives adequate publicity to regulations, con-

tested cases, and individual determinations of widespread interest. But the
views of the Commission on many day-to-day problems are hidden away in
deficiency letters, individual interpretations, and memoranda of private conferences. Many of these are compiled for internal use as precedents to guide

the staff in its actions, either in a volume explaining the Securities Act
and its administration, or in Memoranda of Administrative Practice, containing current rulings. While some of these rulings are published as press

171

releases, the vast majority are not available to the public. [Emphasis added.]
See supra notes 111-13 and 158, and corresponding text.
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prevented by the use of qualified and responsible attorneys given authority to
pass on all Division activity under Rule 14a-8 and especially under 8(c) (1)
and 8(c) (5), to attend all Commission meetings concerning contested proposals and to check all Division letters sent to proponents and management
informing them of the Division or Commission decision.'72
C. Improve Staff Interpretationsunder 8(c) (1) and 8(c) (5)
It is important for the effective and consistent administration of Rule
14a-8, especially with respect to the non-professional stockholder, that staff
attorneys be fully informed of certain rather significant precedents and longrun policy approaches of the Commission. 3 During the proxy season (February through May), adequate research cannot be performed by the staff attorney because of the volume of work. Thus, this approach can guarantee
more consistency.
First, both the Commission.. and the staff75 have taken the long-run
approach that a proponent may revise a vague and indefinite proposal or remove improper parts of an objectionable proposal under the applicable state law
( 8(c) (1) ). Thus, the stockholder-proponent should always be furnished an
opportunity within a reasonable time limit to correct such inadequacies.
Second, the staff should be made aware of certain basic tenets as to the
proper form for many types of proposals under applicable state laws so that
the proponent may be given the opportunity to correct inadequacies under
8(c) (1). Some of these tenets are:
1. Where management argues that because applicable state
statute provides that the business shall be managed by the board of directors,
the board has exclusive discretion unless the certificate or by-laws are amended
with respect to the specific matter; a proper proposal in regard to the subject
matter may take at least three forms: the form of a recommendation or request to the board of directors to take the necessary action (i.e., an advisory
resolution); a proposed by-law amendment, if the stockholders can amend
the by-laws directly; and a proposed amendment of the certificate, if the stockholders can amend the certificate directly. 76
2. Where the state law requires that the charter or the by-laws
be amended to permit the proposed action, the proponent is faced with two
situations: the form of resolution that is proper where the stockholders can
amend the governing instruments; and the form of resolution that is proper for
action by security holders where the stockholders cannot amend the governing
instruments. In the first situation, the proper form is a proposed amendment
by the stockholders, not an advisory resolution." 7 In the second situation, the

172 See supra note; 106, 158 and 162, and corresponding text.
173 See supra notes 151-58, and corresponding text.
174 See supra notes 103-05, and corresponding text.
175 See MEMORANDUM of Director of Division of Corporation Finance to Staff, dated
April 17, 1957, regarding "Stockholder Proposals Combining Objectionable Proposals with
Proper Proposals."
176 See supra notes 46-49, and corresponding text.
177 CC. COM. MIN., February 19, 1962. See supra notes 57-60, and corresponding text.
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proper form of resolution is a request or recommendation to the board to carry
on the particular action which they could do by amending the by-laws."'
3. As noted above, a mandatory proposal which directs or commands the board to do something which by state statute is in the discretion of
the board or which must be initiated by the board often is improper unless
in the form of an advisory proposal which requests or recommends that the
board do the particular thing. The rationale for this difference in the form,
upon which the propriety of the proposal depends, is basically legal. For example, a proposal which commands is capable of being legally binding upon the
directors. If the proposal, because -the action is in the discretion of the board,
cannot be legally binding, it is misleading under Rule 14a-9 79 to give the
impression that the proposal is binding; the advisory resolution, which merely
requests or recommends that the board do something but does not bind it in any
manner, is not misleading in such a situation."'
Third, staff attorneys should be informed that the failure of management
to carry its two phases in the burden of proving"'. that the proposal is not a
proper subject for action by security holders under the laws of the issuer's
domicile will cause the inclusion of the proposal or the non-recognition of the
particular argument (8(c) (1) ) by the staff, notwithstanding an independent
analysis of the state law and proposal by the staff. It is not the SEC's job to
interpret state law except where management has carried this burden of proof.
Finally, the best way to develop an understanding by the staff of the
meaning of proper subjects for shareholder action under 8 (c) (1) and of "ordinary business operations" under 8(c) (5) would be to develop a classification
of proposals by subject matter.
The following classification might be of some aid.
1. Accountability and Reporting to Stockholders by Management
a. Post-Meeting Reports
Generally, a resolution, Whether mandatory or advisory, proposing that a
report containing a digest of the activity at each annual stockholder meeting
be sent to shareholders, is proper for action by security holders. These proposals
are included, notwithstanding the form, because under the Transamerica decision there is no logical reason to omit them, since such reports are not part of
the business of 2the company understood to be entrusted to the board by general
18
state statutes.
178 BB, COM. MIN., March 2, 1954. See supra notes 61-62, and corresponding text.
179 Rule 14a-9 (17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1964) ) specifically provides that no solicitation subject to Regulation 14 shall be made by means of any material which under the circumstances is
false or misleading.
180 See supra note 84, and corresponding text.
181 These two phases are: (1) when mianagement contends that a proposal is improper
under applicable state law, management must submit an opinion of counsel and must refer
(i.e., cite) to the applicable statute or case law (See supra notes 111-13, and corresponding
text). If management fails to do this, it seems that the burden of proof has automatically not
been sustained; (2) after management has met the first requirement, its arguments under the
applicable state law must show that the stockholder "resolution is clearly seeking something in
the nature of a nullity." (See supra notes 114-15, and corresponding text.)
182 BB, COM. MIN., March 2, 1954.
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b. Periodic Reports
Here, as with post-meeting reports, a resolution, whether mandatory or
advisory, proposing that the board send monthly or quarterly financial reports to stockholders, is proper. Again, Transamerica permits inclusion, notwithstanding the form that is used. But proposals requesting that certain additional information be contained in the annual reports to stockholders may
be improper, even if the supposedly proper form is used, for instance, where
the additional information requested is subject to being withheld by the management with state court sanction's' or where the additional information cannot properly be furnished by the auditor as directed.'"
c. Proxy Statement
Generally, stockholder proposals requesting additional disclosures in management's proxy statements are proper subjects for action by security holders.""
2. Stockholder Activities
a. Place and Frequency of Meetings
Stockholder proposals requesting a specific date for annual meetings of
stockholders'8 6 and requesting that meetings be held in particular places or,
at least every so often, in a particular city8 " are proper subjects for action by
security holders.
b. Proxy Voting
See the discussion above under II.A3.
3. Stockholder Remuneration and Share Ownership
a. Dividends and Other Tangible Benefits
Resolutions proposing the declaration or payment of cash or stock dividends or the rounding out of resulting fractional payments in stock dividends are
improper for action by security holders.' 8 No matter what form of proposal
is used, this area has been held exclusively within the discretion of the board.
4. Path or Destiny of ParticularCorporate Organization
a. Public Auditors
Proposals directing an independent audit of the financial affairs of a company or its subsidiary. 9 and directing that the company's auditors attend the
annual meeting and answer any questions submitted.9 . are proper for action by
security holders in accordance with the holding in Transamerica.'
b. Major Acquisitions and Sales
A majority of the resolutions in this area propose that major decisions,
183 COM. MIN., January 26, 1954.
184 DIV. LET., October 4, 1955.
185 E.g., DIV. LET., February 21, 1958; COM. MIN., February 13, 1959; DIV. LET.,
April 3, 1959; and DIV. MEMO., February 1, 1962, and DIV. LET., February 2, 1962.
186 COM. MIN., March 7, 1961.
187 CC, COM. MIN., February 19, 1962.
188 See supra notes 53-56, and corresponding text.
189 COM. MINUTES, February 18 and 24, 1958.
190 DIV. LETTERS, September 2, 1959, and January 1, 1960.
191 See supra notes 29-30, and corresponding text.
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such as the acquisition or sale of properties shall not be made by the board of
directors without the approval of a majority of shareholders. Many such proposals are held to be improper, not because the subject under state law is improper, but because the form is improper (i.e., the proposal should have been
in the form of an amendment or advisory or more definite)."'9 Sometimes such
a proposal is in proper form, but it may be excluded because the purchases,
subject to stockholder approval, are so inclusive as to relate to ordinary business
operations.'
c. Liquidation, Merger or Sale
Since most state statutes provide for shareholder action with respect to
liquidation, merger or sale of the assets of a company, the major problem in
the area concerns the proper form such a proposal must take. Mandatory proposals directing the board of directors to liquidate the company are usually improper, because under the applicable state law the action with respect to liquidation must originate with the board. 9 ' Usually advisory resolutions requesting
the board to formulate a plan of liquidation are proper,'9 5 but advisory proposals requesting the merger and setting out some of the details thereof are improper, because they attempt to set out the terms of the proposed merger,
which attempt is usually contrary to law.9 " However, such a proposal is proper if such
action as to details is sanctioned by law for shareholder considera197
tion.
A mandatory proposal directing, in the event of a merger, that certain financial statements be submitted to the stockholders comes within the Transamerica principle requiring a company to furnish its stockholders information
and is therefore proper for action by security holders. 9
5. Qualification,Selection and Remuneration of Directors and Officers
It should be noted that some of the proposals in this area may be found to
relate to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer if they
refer only to the officers of the company.
a. Qualifications
The qualifications for a nominee to a directorship that are proposed by
stockholder resolutions vary considerably. Usually, such proposals in advisory
form (i.e., in the form of a recommendation or a request) or as amendments
to specific by-laws of the company are proper for action by security holders.
Such proposals include requiring that nominees for a directorshipbe outstanding businessmen with a proven record of achievement 9 9 or own so much stock
of the company .9. or meet a certain age minirmum. 0'"
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DIV. LET., October 4, 1955.
COM. MINUTES, February 18 and 24, 1958.
COM. MIN., April 2, 1956.
AA, COM. MINUTES, March 31 and April 4, 1955.
DIV. LET., February, 1959; see supra note 65, and corresponding text.
COM. MIN., April 27, 1960.
DIV. LETTERS, September 2, 1959, and January 5, 1960.
CC, COM. MIN., February 19, 1962.
COM. MIN., July 30, 1954.
COM. MIN., March 7, 1961, and DIV. LET., March 12, 1962.
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b. Nominations
Generally, resolutions, whether advisory or mandatory, proposing that a
particular person be elected to fill a vacancy or an added position on the board
of directors have been properly omitted," 2 primarily because such a proposal
involves an election to office and Rule 14a-8 specifically does not apply to such.
c. Cumulative Voting
Where state law does not permit cumulative voting for the election of
directors, resolutions proposing the same are improper for shareholder action,
no matter what form the proposal takes. 0 '
Where state law requires the articles of incorporation to provide for cumulative voting and state law also requires the board to initiate the action for
amendment of the articles, a proposal requesting the board to take necessary
steps to provide for cumulative voting is proper for a vote by security holders.2
Likewise, a resolution proposing the amendment of the company's by-laws to
provide for cumulative voting, where state law permits such direct action by
the shareholders, is proper. 0 5
d. Annual Elections
Proposals calling for the annual election of directors, whether advisory,
mandatory or in the form of an amendment to the by-laws, where necessary,
are proper for action by security holders. 0 '
e. Number of Directors
Generally, resolutions proposing an increase in the number of directors are
proper subjects for action by security holders, if in the proper form. Where state
law requires that by-laws fix the number of directors and the by-laws must be
amended by action of the board of directors, a resolution requesting the board
to take that action is necessary. °T
f. Remuneration
Generally, the setting and limiting of salaries of officers, not directors, of
the corporation are held to relate to the conduct of ordinary business operations
of the issuer. 0 8 However, where state law permits shareholders to fix officers'
salaries, as well as directors' salaries, a resolution proposing such, and in the
required form, is proper for action by security holders and does not relate to
the conduct of the ordinary business operations."'
A resolution proposing a reduction in directors' salaries is proper for shareholder action, when in proper form." 0 But a resolution proposing a reduction
202 DIV. LET., January 31, 1958, and COM. MINUTES, February 26, 1959, and February
16, 1961.
203 COM. MIN., July 30, 1954.
204 COM. MINUTES, February 24 and 27, 1961.
205 COM. MIN., March 30, 1959.
206 DIV. LETTERS, March 2 and 3, 1961, and COM. MIN., February 13, 1962.
207 BB, COM. MIN., March 2, 1954.
208 DIV. LET., February 21, 1958.
209 DIV. LET., April 25, 1955.
210 E.g., COM. MINUTES, Februark, 22, 1959, and March 15 and 21, 1960; NN, DIV.
LET., March 27, 1959; DIV. LET., February 29, 1960, and COM. MIN., March 8, 1961;
and DIV. LET., August 16, 1960.
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in executives' salaries is usually held to relate to the conduct of ordinary business
operations.21 However, such a view may not hold if the applicable state law
permits shareholder action in this area212 or if the proposal, although referring
to executives' salaries, would apply to only two directors.21 ,
6. Activities of the Board of Directors
There are a few proposals submitted to management by stockholders advising or directing that something be done or made known about the everyday activities of the board of directors itself. Because of the dearth of proposals
in this area, no significant trends have been evidenced.
7. Running of the Business in All its OperationalPhases
No major subject matter of stockholder proposals is more closely aligned
to the common concept of ordinary business operations than this; many of the
subjects are found to relate to ordinary business operations within the meaning
of Rule 14a-8(c) (5).
a. Wages
Most listed companies have some form of stock option and pension plans
for their employees and officers. A number of proposals are submitted each
year to these companies requesting amendment of such plans, the termination of
them, the setting up of new plans, changes in the application of the plans, or
certain restrictions on any plans adopted in the future.
Pension plans have been held, generally, to concern the wages of the
employees of 214
the company, and, therefore, the ordinary business operations of
the company.
Resolutions can relate to stock option plans for directors, officers and employees, the propriety of the proposal depending upon which group is beneficiary.
Generally, resolutions proposing conditions for a future stock plan for directors
and officers are proper for action by security holders.' 5 But resolutions proposing
that a stock option plan presently in effect be amended to impose certain new
conditions are improper either because such terms would violate binding contracts between the company and the optionees 1 or relate to the conduct of the
ordinary business operations since the terms proposed relate to wage payment
activities. 1
Resolutions submitting by-laws or certificate amendments prohibiting the
issuance of incentive options to officers and directors without stockholder approval1 8 and forbidding the issuing of stock options unless issued to all stockholders of the corporation2 9 have been held proper for action by security holders.
211

COM. MIN., February 22, 1959.

212

DIV. LET., August 16, 1960.

213 COM. MINUTES. March 15 and 21, 1960.
214 E.g., DIV. LETTERS, February 14, 1955, February 24, 1956, February 13, 1958, and
March 4, 1959; COM. MIN., January 13, 1954; and DIV. LETTERS, March 2 and 3, 1961.
215 DIV. LET., January 6, 1958.
216 DIV. LET., December 5, 1956.
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COM. MIN., March 13, 1959.
COM. MIN., March 3, 1961.
DIV. LET., February 17, 1960.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

b. Hiring Policies
Proposals concerned with the qualifications of employees have been held
to relate to ordinary business operations,"' as have those proposing the dismissal
221
or the investigation of the issuer's lawyers.
c. Products
Proposals relating to the size or speed of a company's products have been
222
held to relate to the ordinary business operations of the issuer.
d. Outsider Relations
Some proposals for improving the relationship between the company and
its stockholders relate to ordinary business operations. These proposals include
requests that the board extend to stockholders the same privilege of purchasing
directors. 223
the company's products that is accorded employees, officers and
Generally, proposals respecting sales to and relations with customers are held

to relate to the ordinary business operations.2 2

e. Litigation
A proposal consenting to a derivative action against the president and
chairman of the board of the issuer is a proper subject for action by security
holders under some state laws which require that the majority of stockholders
assent to such action. 22' A resolution proposing a suit against another company,
its management and certain officers of the issuer for violation of the antitrust
laws is also proper.22

f. Improving the Business
A proposal demanding that, if a certain service performed by the company
does not pay, certain alternate action should be taken, relates to ordinary business
operations, 2 7 as does a detailed proposal advising and directing the management
as to the means to be used to improve the relationship between the issuer and
a controlling parent."2 8
220 DIV. LET., January 31, 1956.
221 COM. MIN., February 29, 1960; see supra notes 131-32, and corresponding text.
222 E.g., DIV. LETTERS, March 22, 1955, March 19, 1958, and March 23, 1959, and
COM. MIN., February 20, 1964; COM. MIN., March 4, 1964.
223 DIV. LET., April 15, 1959.
224 DIV. LETTERS, March 23, 1960, and March 14, 1961.
225 E.g., COM. MIN., January 6, 1959. But see DIV. MEMO. of February 7, 1964, and
proxy material of this same company.
226 COM. MINUTES, March 4 and 5, 1958.
227 DIV. LET., March 3, 1959, and COM. MIN., April 1, 1960.
228 DIV. LET., April 14, 1959.
APPENDIX
Rule 14a-8 (a) If any security holder entitled to vote at a meeting of security holders of
the issuer shall submit to the management of the issuer a reasonable time before the solicitation is made a proposal which is accompanied by notice of his intention to present the
proposal for action at the meeting, the management shall set forth the proposal in its proxy
statement and shall identify the proposal in its form of proxy and provide means by which
security holders can make the specification provided for by Rule 14a-4(b). A proposal so
submitted with respect to an annual meeting more than 60 days in advance of a day corresponding to the first date on which management proxy soliciting material was released
to security holders in connection with the last annual meeting of security holders shall
prima facie be deemed to have been submitted a reasonable time before the solicitation.
This rule shall not apply, however, to elections to office.
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These suggestions are made in the hope that they will be taken by the
staff of the Division of Corporation Finance and the Commission itself as a
challenge which, if accepted with all its ramifications, can improve the SEC's
administration of this most informal decision-making process and keep Rule 14a-8
in all its complexity from becoming oppressive to the small individual stockholder.
Indeed, if accepted in the spirit intended, this challenge can make the second
decade since the amendment of the stockholder proposal rule a real period of
shareholder democracy.

(b) If the management opposes the proposal, it shall also, at the request of the
security holder, include in its proxy statement the name and address of the security holder
and a statement of the security holder in not more than one hundred words in support of
the proposal. The statement and request of the security holder shall be furnished to the
management at the same time that the proposal is furnished. Neither the management nor
the issuer shall be responsible for such statement.
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the management may omit a proposal and any
statement in support thereof from its proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the
following circumstances:
(1)
If the Proposal as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not
a proper subject for action by security holders; or
(2)
If it dearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder
primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance
against the issuer or its management, or primarily for the purpose of promoting general
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes; or
(3)
If the management has at the security holder's request included a proposal
in its proxy statement and form of proxy relating to either of the last two annual meetings
of security holders or any special meeting held subsequent to the earlier of such two annual
meetings and such security holder has failed without good cause to present the proposal,
in person or by proxy, for action at the meeting; or
(4) If substantially the same proposal has previously been submitted to security
holders, in the management's proxy statement and form of proxy relating to any annual
or special meeting of security holders held within the preceding five calendar years, it may
be omitted from the management's proxy material relating to any meeting of security
holders held within the three calendar years after the latest such previous submission, provided that ( i ) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during such preceding period, it received less than 3% of the total number of votes
cast in regard thereto; or
(ii)
if the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during such preceding period it received at the time of its second submission less
than 6% of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(iii) if the proposal was submitted at three or more meetings during such
preceding period, it received at the time of its latest submission less
than 10% of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto.
(5) If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the issuer.
(d) Whenever the management asserts that a proposal and any statement in support thereof may properly be omitted from its proxy statement and form of proxy, it shall
file with the Commission, not later than 20 days prior to the date the preliminary copies
of the proxy statement and form of proxy are filed pursuant to Rule 14a-6(a), or such
shorter period prior to such date as the Commission may permit, a copy of the proposal
and any statement in support thereof as received from the security holder, together with a
statement of the reasons why the management deems such omission to be proper in the
particular case, and, where such reasons are based on matters of law, a supporting opinion
of counsel. The management shall at the same time, if it has not already done so, notify
the security holder submitting the proposal of its intention to omit the proposal from its
proxy statement and form of proxy and shall forward to him a copy of the statement of the
reasons why the management deems the omission of the proposal to be proper and a copy
of such supporting opinion of counsel.

